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THE ONTOLOGY OF PRODUCTION: 
KARL MARX AND NISHIDA KITARÓ.




Our aim is to think about the ontology of production from Marx and 
Nishida Kitaró’s (1870-1945) point of view. Nishida is a Japanese phi-
losopher who wrote several essays on a large number of subjects, con-
sidered a very important figure in Japanese philosophy. Indeed, he was 
the founder of the Kyoto School. 
Beyond the Marx’s standpoint, our plan is to reflect about the essays 
compiled under the title Ontology of Production, in particular the essay 
entitled “Human Being” (Kitaró, 2012a). One question to consider is 
what does a Japanese philosopher think about the concept of produc-
tion? And what is the ontology of production to Marx? We intend to 
demonstrate that the dialogue between East and West is essential. 
“Nishida never lost sight of his central problem, namely, the confron-
tation of Oriental Buddhistic ideas with Western philosophy”, says, for 
example, Matao Noda (1955, 345). 
For Nishida there is a fundamental groundlessness of thinking. For 
him, behind the rational, there is the irrational and this is a fundamen-
tal feature of his philosophy. Besides, we must understand what pro-
duction is and how human beings can make and remake the world. In 
our reading, there isn’t the temptation to see in Nishida’s philosophy 
any fidelity to Marxist orthodoxy. Our endeavour is, precisely, to 
understand the ontology of production from both thinkers. 
1 Grateful to Paula Couto.
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2. Marx
As we know, the notion of production is very large. We could mention 
the distinction between poiesis and praxis (Aristotle), and the notion of 
production as work. Marx demonstrates that labor is the truest relation 
between man and nature.  Therefore, we must pay attention to the 
several meanings of production. Aristotle dignifies poiesis (the relation-
ship between man and nature) and praxis (the relationship between 
man to man), and in that way he considers manual work as degrading, 
proper to slaves. We must, then, take this into account if we want to 
deepen our knowledge about production. 
Indeed, production means poiesis, praxis and appropriation. However, 
there are two kinds of appropriation: The appropriation of nature by 
the power of production, and the private propriety, which refers to an 
owner and its property. We must, also, take into account that global 
economy is driven not only by production but also by the machinations 
of financial markets. How can we think, now, the concept of production 
if there is the economy of global capital and another kind of commod-
ities and even other types of production and products? 
In the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx calls 
“Robinsonades” to economists as Adam Smith and David Ricardo who 
define society as an association of individuals. Overcoming this 
assumption, Marx defends that society comes up as a result of material 
production. The human as a political animal needs to be understood 
as a creator. The social animal means the human being who lives in 
society. However, we must emphasize what is unknown to the econo-
mists, that is, the relationship between historical processes and social 
productions. Marx adds: “Production in general is an abstraction, but 
it is a rational abstraction, in so far as it singles out and fixes the com-
mon features, thereby saving us repetition”.  
In 1851 Marx had announced and postponed the publication of a 
work entitled Economics, as he neglected this intention until 1857. 
Meanwhile he wrote some important essays. The Grundrisse (Outlines) 
of a critique of Political Economy, and other works (Towards a Critique of 
Political Economy) are essential to understand the notion of value, pro-
duction, and many other issues.  When Marx wrote the Grundrisse he 
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had thought to divide the Economics in six volumes. The Critique of 
Political Economy, published in 1859, was the first.
In fact, the Grundrisse was written by Marx in the years 1857-8 and 
remained unpublished until 1941. It’s in this volume that the ontology 
of production is well determined. First, when we think about produc-
tion we refer to material production. Marx says: “Individuals producing 
in society, thus the socially determined production of individuals, nat-
urally constitutes the starting-point” (Marx, 2000, 380). The fiction is 
the credit conceded to the individual, as if history was made of the 
agglomeration of individuals. Production shows a different under-
standing: production is the stuff of history and shows always individuals 
socially determined. The family and the clan illustrate the social union. 
The civil society, in the eighteenth century, illustrates the same thing. 
Production is therefore production of social individuals at a certain 
stage of social development.  There are stages of development that have 
certain landmarks. Moreover: if the isolated individual gains impor-
tance, it is because there is a period historically determined and this 
idea became prevalent. Thus, that idea is itself a result of history. There-
fore, everything we can think about production must take into account 
the production by social individuals and the corresponding stage of 
social development. There is no other way. We will see, later on, the 
standpoint of Michel Henry on this issue.
The reading of the Theses on Feuerbach (1845) is important because it 
shows how we must conceive reality as a sensuous human activity, 
practice, not in the form of the object or of contemplation. Feuerbach 
himself does not conceive human activity as an objective activity. There-
fore, his distinction between sensuous activity and thought objects isn’t 
enough. If Feuerbach’s anthropology is based on the concept of Gat-
tungswesen, which means “generic essence” or “species being”, Marx 
emphasizes the notion of production. In fact, the sphere of Feuerbach’s 
philosophy is consciousness, ideas and representation, “as if we have 
reinforced the Kantian and Fichtean assertion of the autonomy of con-
sciousness” (Ricoeur, 1986, 31). For Marx the sphere is praxis.
According to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Law (1844) the criticism of religion is the “premise of all criticism”. 
Therefore, we must understand religion and its role in the history of 
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mankind in order to understand our lives. The criticism of religion isn’t 
one type of criticism; it’s the main source, the matrix to understand 
human societies. As we know, Feuerbach’s shadow instigated Marx to 
think as he does in his critique to the philosophy of Hegel. “Man makes 
religion, religion does not make man”, wrote Marx (Marx/Engels, 1975, 
175). However, Marx recognizes some important achievements of 
Hegel’s philosophy. For example: ”The outstanding achievement of 
Hegel’s Phänomenologie and of its final outcome, the dialectic of nega-
tivity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel 
conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification 
as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this aliena-
tion: that he thus grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objec-
tive man – true, because real man – as the outcome of man’s own labour.“ 
(Marx/Engels, 1975, 332-333)
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), Marx’s first draft 
of Economics, it is important to note that worker’s relationship to his 
product result in alienation. Therefore, we must understand the rela-
tionship between alienation and the money system. Then we must rec-
ognize the political economy and notions like wage, property, exchange, 
and so on. Furthermore, the worker becomes himself a commodity, 
which means that the depreciation of the human world progresses in 
“proportion to the increase in value of the world of things”. For Marx, 
the worker produces commodities and is himself a commodity. 
In fact, the worker produces himself as an alien being. He produces 
the object, but in so doing, he produces himself into a thing. Marx says 
that in political economy “this realization of labour appears as a loss 
of reality for the worker, objectification as a loss of the object or slavery 
to it, and appropriation as alienation, as externalization”.
In his reflection, Marx doesn’t differentiate political economy and 
religion. His purpose is to show human alienation, and so that condi-
tion within the political system and within religion. The human 
becomes strange to himself. Not just poor but unhappy.  The worker 
no longer belongs to himself but to the object. 
The Manuscripts (1844) shows that the reflection about work, wage, 
capital and others, depends on a philosophical reflection based on the 
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ontology of production. In fact, man is the creator, the worker; man 
transforms and acts in a way that the political economy never fully 
realizes. The author of the Manuscripts insists that “(…) the worker is 
related to the product of his labour as to an alien object. For on this prem-
ise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more pow-
erful becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and 
against himself, the poorer he himself – his inner world – becomes the 
less belongs to him as his own” (Marx/Engels, 1975, 272).
We must refer to the importance of concepts such as ideology and 
alienation in the Manuscripts. We know, following Paul Ricoeur (1986), 
that ideology doesn’t have a specific treatment in that text. It’s only in 
German Ideology that Marx thinks ideology fully. However, in the Man-
uscripts, ideology is referred indirectly and it constitutes the beginning 
of the German ideology thinking. Paul Ricoeur, in Lectures on Ideology 
and Utopia, says that “alienation of the products of one’s labor is the 
model for Marx’s depiction of the concept of alienation as a whole” 
(Ricoeur, 1986, 41).
Other important remark is the notion of production in the Manu-
scripts. So, Ricoeur says: “Marx usage of the concept of creation is 
extremely important because it provides a scope to the concept of pro-
duction that is much broader than mere economics. I sometimes won-
der whether orthodox Marxism’s dogmatic reduction of everything to 
production does not proceed from a failure either to know or remember 
that for the young Marx at least the concept of production is defined 
by creation and not the contrary” (Ricoeur, 1986, 46).
We must also understand the critique to idealism through the notions 
of representation and subjectivity. Marx condemns them as he condemns 
Feuerbach’s materialism. Practical activity is the only way to overcome 
the ambiguities of representation and subjectivity (idealism) and a mere 
and passive materialism. Emphasizing practical activity is the way to 
show the necessity to organize the world (idealism) and the importance 
of activity (work, practice, transformation). We agree with Balibar when 
he says: “What he proposes is quite simply to explode the contradiction, 
to dissociate representation and subjectivity and allow the category of 
practical activity to emerge in its own right” (Balibar, 1995, 25). There-
fore, we must transfer the category of subjectivity and representation 
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to practice. Not simply eliminate them, but transform them into the very 
idea of subjectivity and show how practice really is.
What is truly new in Marx’s philosophy? Not only the philosophical 
reflections, but also the economic and social reflections, as the man 
political action: Marx himself. What is new is the other way of doing 
philosophy. A new conception of what knowledge and practice is. If 
we can’t separate ontology and production, we can´t separate ontology, 
production and social relations. 
We can remind the expression of Balibar in the first page of The 
philosophy of Marx (1995): “Marx is more important for philosophy than 
ever before”. This is the second phrase, the first is: “There is no Marxist 
philosophy and there never will be”.
This simply means that there isn’t a Marxist philosophy notwith-
standing the existence of a philosophy in Marx’s thought. Balibar 
defends this (apparent) paradox. But there are other issues: Marx tries 
to prove an alternative to philosophy: a non-philosophy or even an 
anti-philosophy.
This “new” philosophy in no way distinguishes the historical from 
the philosophical or the economic. Marx’s reflection assumes that there 
is no distinction between them. In short, more than a philosophy of 
action, what Marx proposes is a new understanding of action itself. The 
revolutionary movement needs action. The proletarians must act. Phi-
losophy is nothing if it doesn’t account for that necessity. 
Thus, the task of philosophy is to serve history, which means that 
the immediate function of philosophy is to serve history. Why so?  If 
history is the theatre of the “self-estrangement in its unholy forms”, 
philosophy must think why human societies are produced like that. 
What Marx refers to emphatically is the German social and historical 
status quo. The progress is possible if one class, the proletariat, has the 
power to transform the present and the possibility to sustain theoreti-
cally that revolution. So “the head of this emancipation is philosophy, 
its heart is the proletariat” (Marx/Engels, 1975, 187).
Finally, there is an important point of view that we must consider if 
we want to clarify Marx’s ontology of production. We refer to Michel 
Henry, in particularly the essay entitled “Introduction à la pensée de 
Marx” (Henry, 2008). For our purpose, we don’t need to deepen 
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Henry’s philosophy and read, for example, Marx, the most important 
work of the French philosopher on Marx (Henry, 1976). In fact, we just 
want to refer another standpoint. For Henry we must overcome “Marx-
ism” and understand Marx himself. How? “The rise to the origin of 
Marxism, such is the introduction to the thought of Marx” (Henry, 2008, 
10). Paradoxically, Henry argues that Marx´s thinking has nothing to 
do with materialism, social class or history, for example. But the essen-
tial issue for our purpose is the argument that defends that “there is no 
history, there are only historical individuals”. In fact, for Michel Henry 
more important than class is individual: “Is the determination of indi-
vidual life that originates social class.”2 Michel Henry considers that 
Marx’s philosophy is a radical defense of the individual, “de la subjec-
tivité individuelle”. And it is this philosophy that produces a new 
ontology. For us, Marx’s philosophy is a new expression of the ontology 
of production based, precisely, in other notions: on Feuerbach’s mate-
rialism, with a new impact on history and a new philosophical vision 
of economy and the fact that history overlaps individuals. However, 
as we can see, the ontology as production remains an open field. 
3. Nishida Kitaró
Agustin Jacinto Zavala, in “Acercamiento a la filosofia de la Historia em 
Nishida Kitaro”, says that Nishida is one of the greatest thinkers of Japan 
(Zavala, 1981, 130).  First, the practice and reflection of Zen was his main 
interest. Afterwards, it came the problem of ethics, knowledge and his-
tory. Our intention is just to mention the perspective of history for 
Nishida, particularly what he thought about praxis and poiesis. Nishida 
wrote in 1940 an Introduction to a Philosophy of Praxis. But what is praxis? 
And poiesis? To Zavala, interpreting Nishida’s philosophy, “the philos-
ophies of praxis don’t start with subjective and moral consciousness” 
(Zavala, 1981, 136). We must, indeed, overcome the rational subjectivism.
2 The complete quote is: “C’est la détermination de cette vie (la vie individuelle), la détermination 
des individus, de leur action et de leur pensée qui fait, qui est la détermination de la classe » 
(Henry, 2008, 14). Later (2008, 27), the author wrote : « Et cette réalité dernière, qui fonde l’économie 
elle-même et qui la détermine ultimement, c’est la vie subjective individuelle ». 
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After 1924 there were meetings with Miki Kiyoshi and Kawakami 
Hajime with the purpose to discuss Marxism and its social impact. 
Indeed, after 1920 Marxism was very important in Japan.  In 1933-1934, 
with the publishing of Fundamental Problems in Philosophy, Nishida 
thinks reality with the point of view of our self, our active self. The true 
action must be personal. Nishida finishes the first part of Fundamental 
Problems in Philosophy writing that “philosophy never, until now, has 
truly thinking from the point of view of the active self. Therefore, we 
don’t think from the background what is the world of the actual reality 
where we act” (Kitaró, 2014). So the active self is a social self. Every 
person is a person with others. 
In order to understand ontology of production, we must look care-
fully into “Human Being”, an essay written in 1938 (Kitaró, 2012). First 
of all, “the world of historical actuality is the world of production”. 
Then, we create things, produce them, and things have a historical world. 
History has in fact a double face: the self is opposed to things and vice-
versa. Nevertheless, they utterly oppose and contradict each other; it 
is inevitably that they affect each other. Nishida has a chief expression 
to say that: life is always a moving from the made to the making. “Crea-
tion”, “production” and “history” are interrelated expressions that we 
must recognize essential to characterize the human being. However, 
we can’t forget that contradiction “is the fact of human life”. There are 
contradictions between the self and the thing, self-contradiction and, 
to summarize, contradiction is the problem of our life and death. 
For Nishida our intentional action arises as historical form-making 
activity. The true objective intentional action that makes things histor-
ically is praxis. Nonetheless, there is no intentional action and no praxis 
that is not productive. 
We must remark that for Nishida intuition is always active. “Active 
intuition is «intuition» insofar it is an immediate apprehension logi-
cally prior to any distinction between apprehending subject and appre-
hending object”. (Kitaró, 2012a, 24). Or, in other terms, “acting-intuition” 
is Nishida’s term for the dialectical interactivity between human self 
and world, whereby we see things by working upon them, and as we 
work upon our environment our self-awareness is in turn shaped. 
Thus, in shaping the world, we in turn are shaped by it in the world’s 
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self-formation. The world is the place (basho) that forms itself, and we 
are involved in that formation of the world” (Kitaro/Krummel, 2012, 6). 
The human existence is “self-contradictory because it is simultaneously 
autonomous and a part of the world. Like Krummel says (Kitaró, 2012 
b, 31): “As homo faber we reshape the world with tools and technology 
to assert our independence from it and yet simultaneously this is the 
world’s own self-creativity working through ourselves. The dialectic 
is such that human beings in their autonomous creativity are actively 
taking part in the world’s own self-creation.”
The notion of basho is central to understand Nishida’s philosophy. 
The translators render the Japanese word by place or topos or even 
“lieu” (some French translators) (Heleno, 2014). Although this basho is 
nothingness, we must pay attention to the relationship between nothing 
as a place, and not, like de Eastern ontology, as being. So, one thing that 
differentiates East and West is, respectively, the notion of being/not 
being (the issue of ontology) and the real importance of nothingness. 
Naturally, this makes the difference between what we understand 
about ontology and production.  Basho precedes any intellectual dichot-
omization between experience and reality. Truly, “it refers to the most 
concrete situatedness at the base of our being, entailing a non distinction 
between experience and reality, hence a priority to the subject-object 
dichotomy or the distinction between ideal and real. It would be the 
«place» enveloping and encompassing all mental acts and their objects, 
all perspectival horizons of intentionality that constitute the world of 
objects” (Kitaró, 2012 b, 9).
Surely, there is a concern with the meaning of consciousness and 
also the object. The ontology of consciousness means that we must take 
into account the reflexivity of self-awareness. But what Nishida means 
is another kind of ontology and furthermore another perspective of 
consciousness. For him, the consciousness is a field that cannot be 
grasped as an individual substance but rather as a field that is the 
opening of world and self. That field overcome the idea of self-aware-
ness, because the knowledge must be understand as a “locus of non-dif-
ferentiation behind the distinction between such awareness and things 
seen from its vantage point”, like John Maraldo writes (Maraldo, 2015). 
And he continues “as non-differentiated and inclusive, that locus is 
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field-like, a metaphor that Nishida at first replaced with the notion of 
topos or “place” (basho)”.
Thus, there isn’t something like a passive intuition. Self, further-
more, is active, and this is why it was historical. Men are beings who 
make history, and there is no other possibility. “Dialectically, to see is 
to act, and to act is to see” (Kitaró, 2012a, 148). However, if we must 
act, we must destroy. That means that absolute negation becomes medi-
ation and the “thing is mediated by life and death”. Production is, 
therefore, the mediation between absolute negation and absolute con-
struction. 
The influence of German idealism in Nishida’s philosophy is noto-
rious, it is the best way to be aware of the dialectic between the self and 
the world. If not so, neither the notion of production nor of history have 
meaning. For Nishida there is an expressive activity, that is, “when we 
say we make things, it is always with respect to what is objectively 
expressive. What is in this sense objectively expressive is reason. The 
logos is characteristic of poiesis.” (Kitaró, 2012a, 149). Production is thus 
an expansion of the self. And then “our life exists in making things; 
what is called productive life must be grasped from expressive activity” 
(Kitaró, 2012a, 149).  Important is to say that, heretofore, expressive 
activity is the expression of conscience self. However, conscience must 
be seen from the point of view of historical production. In the end of 
“Human Being” Nishida says: “Our knowledge arises from the fact 
that we, as singularities in the historical world, see the thing in expres-
sive activity. It is from there that we are continually seeing the thing 
self-contradictorily” (Kitaró, 2012a, 185).
We must, then, interpret production at least in three ways: a) The 
radical historicity of human being; b) the making of things; c) the 
appropriation of nature, this means, the essential relation between man 
and nature. Production is not a power of man through or over nature. 
If this is true, we must reinterpret the history of philosophy. In many 
philosophers there isn’t any care about the radical historicity of man, 
social relations and so forth. Man, says Nishida, is the apex between 
the made and me the making. We must reiterate that production is 
necessarily ontologically constitutive for man. Like William Haver 
wrote in his introduction to Ontology of Production,  “if production is 
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necessarily ontologically constitutive for man, if in fact we exist not 
merely because we make things but only in the making of things (poie-
sis), then what Marx called a « mode of production» is a materialistic 
nickname for ontology”. (2012a, 10). And a little after: “For Nishida 
consciousness itself is not a subjective phenomenon; subjectivity hap-
pens but only as an effect, never as cause.”
Appropriation is another concept that engages Marx and Nishida 
alike. There is no production without appropriation. This means: the 
identity between production and ontology is an appropriation of the 
world by man. In an explicit reference to historical materialism (2012, 
164), Nishida wrote that “the world of matter is a world that neither 
moves mechanically nor develops biologically. It is necessarily a world 
that is continually forming itself in expressive activity, which is to say, 
in production”. And later he also wrote: “our life arises from seeing the 
thing dialectically”. 
Finally, each society, for Nishida, is a kind of poiesis. Zavala (1994) 
quotes the last works of Nishida saying that the world must be thought 
as a dialectical world. There is a historical present, and in it opposes 
dialectically the past and the future. So, we can say that the infinite past 
is the thesis; the future is the infinite possibilities (antithesis) and the 
present is the synthesis. The more they oppose, the greater is poiesis in 
the present. 
4. Concluding remarks
Nishida’s language is strongly Hegelian. In “Human Being” there is 
no reference to concepts like ideology, alienation, concepts that deepens 
the relationship between man and the world. In fact, it is impossible 
for us to reflect about the ontology of production without such con-
cepts. History, praxis, poiesis, are concepts that mean something to us 
only if we go further in our reflection, that is, if we notice their achieve-
ments and failures. 
Marx’s aim is to understand and suppress alienation and ideology. 
However, we should suspect that it’s not only capitalism that produces 
them. As we have seen, particularly in Nishida’s essay “Human Being” 
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- but in others too -, when he reflects about the “ontology of produc-
tion” there aren’t any concerns about such problems. If the text of 
Nishida is excessively “pure”, Marx’s philosophy defends another kind 
of optimism. Nevertheless, we must emphasize that Nishida  doesn’t 
need to be a “Marxist”, this is, his propose is not to depict Marx’s phi-
losophy but rather to reflect about such issues. What is common to both 
thinkers is the German idealism, despite the criticism they make. 
It’s time to make the concluding remarks about our purpose. In fact, 
“ontology of production” means also “ontology as production”. Indeed, 
it would have been possible to start our reflection with Michel Henry’s 
essay entitled “Le Concept de L’être comme production” (Henry, 2004). 
Therein, the sequence of the author’s thinking is: to know what is the 
meaning of Aristotle’s causes, the Heideggerian´s standpoint, Hegel’s 
notion of work and, most importantly, the “new” meaning of ontology 
defended by Marx. Indeed, Marx’s overcoming of the notion of rep-
resentation proposes a new vision of action (praxis) which shows a new 
philosophy. 
However, if our purpose is to illustrate the notion of ontology and 
production, we try to emphasize what the young author´s of the Man-
uscripts thinks about that. As we have seen, the notions of work, wage, 
and others introduce a new kind of bondage between man and the 
world. Indeed, Marx makes a new philosophy because he refreshes the 
bond between ontology and production. 
Nishida Kitaró shows another point of view. Undeniably, ontology 
is reconsidered if we underscore the notions of history, active intuition 
and “basho”. In fact, we don’t expand this last notion of Kitaró’s phi-
losophy. However, we must remark that with Nishida the question of 
ontology is really the relation between notions as place and nothing-
ness. “Basho in its deepest sense is understood as the concrete situation, 
i.e., the “placedness” or “implacement” of our lived experience vis-a-
vis reality, in the whole of its dynamic structure, that grounds cogni-
tion and whence the bifurcation into subject-object derives” (Kitaró, 
2012 b, 6).
What is, then, the future of the notion of production? Emphasize, 
for example, Marx’s concepts or take notice of Nishida’s basho? Like 
Krummel wrote (Kitaro/Krummel, 2012, 4): “Nishida stood in relation 
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to Kantian epistemology and Husserl’s phenomenology of conscious-
ness as he was developing his theory of place in the attempt to avoid 
the pitfalls of dualism, hylomorphism, and substantialism”. As we 
tried to demonstrate, what binds both thinkers is the importance of 
social history, the overcoming of dualisms and a new perspective of 
action and creativity. 
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